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Abstract
This Note offers a new conception of news distortion in mass
media. It explores the intentions behind the FCC’s News Distortion
Doctrine and analyzes its primarily dormant status throughout its
existence. This Note then examines televised media coverage of U.S.
military actions and identifies undisclosed financial conflicts of
interests throughout this coverage. In examining these undisclosed
conflicts and the reasons behind them, this Note explains why they
constitute news distortion under the FCC’s definition, and why the
principles behind the Doctrine are implicated. This Note then
proposes the FCC promulgate a disclosure rule to remedy the
undisclosed financial conflicts of interest. It also proposes that
Congress amend the Communications Act of 1934 to authorize this
rule promulgation.
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I. Introduction
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)1 has made it
clear that “[r]igging or slanting the news is a most heinous act
against the public interest [and] . . . there is no act more harmful
to the public’s ability to handle its affairs.” 2 The agency has
developed a policy over many decades, referred to as the News
Distortion Doctrine (Doctrine), to address this concern.3 It applies
to licensed broadcast stations and can be enforced only in licensing
proceedings.4 Due to omnipresent First Amendment concerns, the
Doctrine’s elements are strict and require an exorbitant amount of
evidence before the FCC will investigate distortion allegations.5
1. The Federal Communications Commission will be primarily referred to
as the “FCC” throughout this note, but the term “Commission” is commonly used
in judicial and FCC opinions.
2. Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d
143, 151 (1969).
3. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THE MEDIA BUREAU, THE
PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING: HOW TO GET THE MOST SERVICE FROM YOUR LOCAL
STATION, at 12 (2019) [hereinafter THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING] (presenting
the News Distortion Doctrine in its entirety).
4. See id. (listing the policies applicable to broadcast journalism and noting
that “licensees may not intentionally distort the news”); see also Chad Raphael,
The FCC’s Broadcast News Distortion Rules: Regulation by Drooping Eyelid, 6
COMM. L. & POL’Y 485, 498 (2001) (“Although the Commission sometimes
considers distortion complaints on a case-by-case basis, it cannot impose fines for
violations, but can only consider them in evaluating the overall character
qualifications of broadcasters when they apply for license renewals.”).
5. See Chad Raphael, The FCC’s Broadcast News Distortion Rules:
Regulation by Drooping Eyelid, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 485, 495–96 (2001) (“In the
absence of any of the four elements, the Commission has been unwilling to find
distortion, or even to investigate a complaint.”).

234

27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 231 (2020)

The rigidity of the Doctrine, the FCC’s inconsistent enforcement of
it, and the fact that it only applies to a subset of television media,
have left the Doctrine unable to address the problem it was
designed to solve.6 Examples of news distortion in corporate media
present the same issues that the Doctrine was designed to address,
yet extend beyond its reach.7
This Note examines the history of the Doctrine, the policy
reasons behind it and then, based on this foundation, proposes a
new conception and application of news distortion in the modern
televised media landscape. Part II analyzes the Doctrine’s history
and looks at where it stands today.8 Part III looks at network news
discussions on U.S. military actions and analyzes disturbing
financial conflicts of interest with the U.S. Defense Department. 9
Part IV makes the case that these conflicts of interest are properly
defined as news distortion, that they undermine the First
Amendment’s ideals, that FCC action can counterintuitively
further the First Amendment’s objectives, and that the current
Doctrine is inadequate to address the issue. 10 Part V proposes a
statutory amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 to
authorize the FCC to promulgate disclosure rules applicable to
cable and satellite providers.11 It then proposes a model financial
disclosure rule to address the issues presented in Part III. Part VI
analyzes the proposed rule’s constitutionality under the First
Amendment.12

6. See id. at 488 (“[T]he Commission’s evidentiary requirements, burden of
proof, shifting definition of news, and sometimes arbitrary reasoning impose a
near-insurmountable burden on complainants.”).
7. See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that the
FCC only licenses “individual broadcast stations” and not “TV or radio networks”).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part VI.
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II. The FCC’s News Distortion Doctrine
A. Contemporary News Distortion Doctrine
The FCC came into existence with the passage of the
Communications Act of 1934.13 The Act authorized the FCC to
license cable and radio broadcast stations and to approve
applicants if it determined that “the public interest, convenience,
and necessity” would be served by granting the application.14 The
FCC only licenses individual broadcast stations and does “not
license TV or radio networks (such as CBS, NBC, ABC or
Fox) . . . except if those entities are also station licensees.” 15 In fact,
many of these network entities are licensees and thus their
stations are subject to the FCC’s jurisdiction.16 In addition, cable
operators that host cable networks (such as CNN, MSNBC, Fox
News, etc.) are not licensees but are subject to a different
regulatory scheme under the FCC’s jurisdiction.17
The FCC’s News Distortion Doctrine applies only to licensed
stations as part of the license application process.18 Licensees must
periodically renew their licenses and, during this renewal period,
the public can file petitions to deny a license renewal. 19 Any news
distortion allegations will be made as part of these petitions and,
if the FCC finds that there are “substantial and material
13. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (creating the FCC “[f]or the purpose of
regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication . . .”).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2018).
15. THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 7.
16. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 247 (2012)
(addressing indecency violations enforced against Fox and ABC, but striking
them down on procedural grounds); see also Complaints Covering CBS Program
“Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 143 (1969) (discussing and concluding a
complaint on the merits involving the national CBS broadcast network).
17. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98
Stat. 2779 (authorizing FCC jurisdiction over cable); see also Turner Broad. Sys.
v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 215–16 (1997) (upholding FCC regulations
applying to cable).
18. See, e.g., TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13591, 13591 (2007) (noting that
the FCC was reviewing the complainants petition to deny the license renewal of
the licensee that allegedly committed news distortion).
19. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (2018) (providing any “party in interest” the right
to petition a broadcaster’s license application).
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question[s] of fact,” then it will proceed with the investigation by
holding a hearing.20 The FCC may reject the petition and decline
to hold a hearing, in which case the petitioner has a right to appeal
the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (D.C. Court of Appeals).21 Conversely, if the FCC finds that
the station is not serving the public interest, then it may reject the
station’s license renewal.22 If the FCC has concluded that the
station distorted the news in violation of its policy, then that will
be factored into its renewal decision.23 That is the full extent of the
Doctrine’s enforcement authority, as it is not a promulgated rule
that can be enforced on its own. 24
For clarity and orientation, the Doctrine is provided below in
its entirety:
The Commission often receives complaints concerning
broadcast journalism, such as allegations that stations have
aired inaccurate or one-sided news reports or comments,
covered stories inadequately, or overly dramatized the events
that they cover. For the reasons noted previously, the
Commission generally will not intervene in these cases because
it would be inconsistent with the First Amendment to replace
the journalistic judgment of licensees with our own. However,
as public trustees, broadcast licensees may not intentionally
distort the news. The FCC has stated that “rigging or slanting
the news is a most heinous act against the public interest.” The
Commission will investigate a station for news distortion if it
20. Id. § 309(e).
21. See FCC v. WJR, Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 274 (1949) (holding
that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals must review the FCC case before
it on the merits).
22. See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 8 (“Before we can
renew a station’s license, we must first determine whether . . . the licensee has
served the public interest . . . .”).
23. See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing news
distortion); see also Raphael, supra note 5, at 498 (“Although the Commission
sometimes considers distortion complaints on a case-by-case basis, it cannot
impose fines for violations, but can only consider them in evaluating the overall
character qualifications of broadcasters when they apply for license renewals.”).
24. See New World Commc’ns of Tampa, Inc. v. Akre, 866 So. 2d 1231, 1233
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“The FCC has never published its news distortion policy
as a regulation with definitive elements and defenses.”); see also Nareissa L.
Smith, Consumer Protection in the Marketplace of Ideas: A Proposal to Extend
the News Distortion Doctrine to Cable Television News Programs, 40 T. MARSHALL
L. REV. 223, 261 (2015) (“It is important to note that at this time, the doctrine is
merely a policy—it has not been adopted as a rule.”).
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receives documented evidence of rigging or slanting, such as
testimony or other documentation, from individuals with direct
personal knowledge that a licensee or its management engaged
in the intentional falsification of the news. Of particular
concern would be evidence of the direction to employees from
station management to falsify the news. However, absent such
a compelling showing, the Commission will not intervene. 25

Legal scholars have deduced four elements, from the FCC’s
distortion reports and its above policy statement, that the
complainant must satisfy before the FCC will classify it as news
distortion.26 The FCC will only find news distortion if there is
(1) an allegation “of deliberate intent to distort the news or mislead
the audience,” (2) extrinsic evidence (in addition to the broadcast
itself) to support the allegation, (3) evidence “that the distortion
was initiated by or known to the licensee” or management
personnel, and (4) an implication of a “significant event, rather
than an incidental part of the news.”27 The extrinsic evidence
element is the most decisive as most allegations are unable to meet
this burden of proof.28
As suggested from the Doctrine’s text, the FCC is extremely
hesitant to even investigate news distortion allegations unless all
four elements are met.29 This reluctance is understandable when
considering the glaring concern that enforcing the Doctrine will
lead to government censorship, or even the appearance of

25. THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12.
26. See Raphael, supra note 5, at 495 (“The Commission has never laid out a
concise statement of what constitutes distortion, but it is possible to fashion a
four-part test from its precedent decisions and subsequent actions.”).
27. Id. at 496; see also Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in
America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 150 (1969) (concluding that there must be “extrinsic
evidence” of “deliberate distortion or staging” that “involves the licensee [and]
includes its principals, top management, or news management”); WPIX, Inc.
(WPIX), New York, New York for Renewal of License, 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 385 (1978)
(concluding that news distortion must involve a “matter of significance” to the
public interest).
28. See “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d at 147 (stating that “intervention
by the [FCC] should be limited to cases where there is extrinsic evidence involving
the licensee or management”).
29. See Raphael, supra note 5, at 496 (“In the absence of any of the four
elements, the Commission has been unwilling to find distortion, or even to
investigate a complaint.”).
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censorship, in violation of the First Amendment. 30 These vital First
Amendment issues will be addressed at length in Part VI.31
The FCC’s last substantive discussion of the Doctrine was in
2007, though news distortion allegations have been made as
recently as 2017.32 The last judicial case to mention it was in
2004.33 However, the Doctrine’s merits have not been considered
since 1998.34 In total, the FCC has reviewed eight complaints
involving the Doctrine since 1999 but only substantively discussed
it two of those times.35 The FCC concluded in all these cases that
there was insufficient evidence of news distortion.36
The Doctrine is effectively dormant today, given the high
standard of evidence needed to trigger an FCC investigation and
the absence of a prescribed regulation.37 The Doctrine’s history, on
the other hand, provides an insightful look into both the FCC’s
reasoning behind its conception and the federal judiciary’s
interpretation of its requirements.38
30. See “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d at 151 (“[I]n this democracy, no
Government agency can authenticate the news, or should try to do so. We will
therefore eschew the censor’s role, including efforts to establish news distortion
in situations where Government intervention would constitute a worse danger
than the possible rigging itself.”).
31. See infra Part VI. First Amendment Constitutional Analysis
32. See TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13591, 13597 (2007) (finding no
prima facie case of news distortion); see also Entercom Commc’n & CBS Radio
Seek Approval to Transfer Control of and Assign FCC Authorizations & Licenses,
32 FCC Rcd. 9380, 9384 (2017) (deciding the case without analyzing the distortion
complaints on the merits).
33. See New World Commc’ns. of Tampa, Inc. v. Akre, 866 So. 2d 1231, 1234
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a whistleblower statute could not provide
a remedy because the plaintiffs alleged a news distortion violation, but the FCC’s
Doctrine was not a promulgated rule so it could not be enforced in this instance).
34. See Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding
that the FCC arbitrarily and capriciously denied the complainant’s petition
without fully considering the news distortion allegations).
35. See Joel Timmer, Potential FCC Actions Against “Fake News”: The News
Distortion Policy and the Broadcast Hoax Rule, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 20 (2019)
(“In addition to these three cases, there were five other cases since 1999 in which
the Commission considered allegations of news distortion. In only two of the eight
cases was there any detailed discussion of news distortion.”).
36. See id. (“Significantly, in none of the cases was news distortion found to
have occurred.”).
37. See id. at 22 (“[I]t is very difficult and uncommon for the requirements
of the news distortion policy to be satisfied.”).
38. See Raphael, supra note 5, at 496 (describing the various “forms of
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B. History of the News Distortion Doctrine
The FCC first expressed a concern for news distortion around
the middle of the twentieth century.39 The Doctrine as it exists
today originated in 1969 after Congress raised concerns about a
particular distortion allegation.40 A congressman brought a
complaint regarding a documentary program titled “Hunger in
America” that had been broadcast multiple times on the Columbia
Broadcasting System’s (CBS) national network.41 The allegations
centered around aired footage of a dying infant claimed to be dying
of malnutrition.42 The complainant alleged that such contention
was false and, additionally, that CBS distorted the news by
directing doctors’ interview statements.43 The FCC, finding
conflicting evidence on both issues, declined to hold an evidentiary
hearing and concluded that further inquiry to resolve the issue was
unwarranted.44
The FCC, in its reasoning, indicated a general hesitancy to
wade into these issues on the ground that “investigat[ing] mere
allegations, in the absence of a material indication of extrinsic
evidence of staging or distortion, would clearly constitute a venture
into a quagmire inappropriate for this Government agency.”45 The
FCC was referring to the First Amendment’s prohibition on

distortion” where the Commission has applied its distortion test).
39. See New World Commc’ns. of Tampa, Inc. v. Akre, 866 So. 2d 1231, 1233
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“The policy’s roots can be traced to 1949 when the FCC
first expressed its concern regarding deceptive news . . . .”).
40. See Raphael, supra note 5, at 495 (“[I]t was not until a series of 19691973 decisions that the Commission began to formalize its definition of distortion.
The FCC did not do so on its own initiative, but in response to Congressional
pressure.”).
41. See Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20
F.C.C.2d 143, 143 (1969) (stating that there are several complaints before the
FCC concerning the “Hunger in America” documentary program).
42. See id. at 144 (“The complaint of Congressman Gonzales charges that
segments of the program were ‘totally false in part and erroneous or misleading
in other parts’ . . . .”).
43. See id. (summarizing the complainant’s allegation that CBS “‘coached’ a
doctor to ‘make dramatic statements’ on malnutrition in San Antonio”).
44. See id. at 147 (concluding that policy concerns regarding editorial
discretion superseded the need for further investigation).
45. Id. at 150.
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government infringement of a free press, which compels significant
editorial discretion for news broadcasters.46
The FCC went on to state that future complaints with similar
evidentiary issues would not warrant further investigation.47
Instead, it would only consider denying a licensee’s renewal if there
was an allegation of “deliberate distortion or staging of the news
which is brought to [the FCC’s] attention, involves the licensee,
[and] includes its principals, top management, or news
management.”48 The FCC added to the rigor of its distortion test a
decade later, declaring that the subject of the distortion allegation
must be a “matter of significance” to the public interest. 49 This
means that the subject matter at issue must be serious enough that
distortion of its reporting warrants agency action, though the FCC
has not defined the phrase.50 This last requirement rounded out
the FCC’s four-element distortion policy that exists today.51
1. The FCC’s News Distortion Opinions
According to a thirty-year study analyzing the FCC’s reported
decisions between 1969 and 1999, the FCC published 120 decisions
on distortion investigations.52 Of those 120 decisions, it ruled

46. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of . . . the press . . . .”); see also THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra
note 3, at 12 (“[I]t would be inconsistent with the First Amendment to replace the
journalistic judgment of licensees with our own.”); see also Ark. Educ. Television
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (noting that broadcasters must
“exercise substantial editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of their
programming . . . .”).
47. See “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d at 150 (stating that the FCC does
“not intend to defer action on license renewals . . . of the kind we have
investigated here” in the future).
48. Id. at 150.
49. See WPIX, Inc. (WPIX), New York, New York for Renewal of License, 68
F.C.C.2d 381, 385 (1978) (concluding that none of the news incidents deceived the
public about a matter of significance).
50. See id. at 384–85 (noting that there were only incidents of “inaccurate
embellishments concerning peripheral aspects” of the news).
51. See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 25 and accompanying
text (providing the current News Distortion Doctrine in its entirety).
52. See Raphael, supra note 5, at 501 (noting that the FCC only “found
against broadcasters in 10%” of the reported decisions).
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against the broadcasters on only twelve occasions.53 Of the twelve
adverse rulings, three of them ended with the FCC either revoking
or declining to renew the broadcaster’s license.54 Hesitancy to
enforce the Doctrine is consistent with the Doctrine itself, which
emphasizes the latitude afforded to news editorial discretion under
the First Amendment.55
In an example of enforcing the Doctrine against a licensee, the
FCC removed multiple licenses from Star Stations, Inc. (Star
Station), a corporation that owned several broadcast companies
across three states.56 The FCC rejected Star Stations’ license
renewal after finding that its owner “had used two of his radio
stations to promote political candidates through the news, and to
make illegal campaign contributions to them.” 57 The FCC
explained that such an action rose to the level of news distortion
because the “newscasts were used as a vehicle to publicize [the
owner’s] preferred candidate—not as an exercise of news
judgment, but as a deception of the public and to further his
private interests.”58 The FCC made it clear that this type of
conduct warrants action, stating that “[s]uch attempts to use
broadcast facilities to subvert the political process cannot be
ignored or condoned.”59
2. The Federal Judiciary’s News Doctrine Opinions
Although there have been a number of FCC memorandum
opinions on distortion allegations, federal courts have heard only
53. See id. (“The Commission has rarely held licensees in violation of the
distortion rules.”).
54. See id. at 504 (“Findings of distortion did contribute to three license
nonrenewals over the thirty year period [from 1969 to 1999] under study.”).
55. See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12 (“[I]t would be
inconsistent with the First Amendment to replace the journalistic judgment of
licensees with our own.”).
56. See Raphael, supra note 5, at 504–05 (noting that the FCC removed
several of the corporation’s licenses for, among other acts, “committing a felony
by making illegal campaign contributions, and distorting news”); see also Star
Stations of Indiana, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 95, 109 (1975) (denying three applications
for license renewal).
57. Raphael, supra note 5, at 505.
58. Star Stations, 51 F.C.C.2d at 107.
59. Id.
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two distortion cases.60 In Galloway v. FCC, the petitioner filed a
complaint with the FCC alleging that the 60 Minutes program on
CBS deliberately distorted a report on insurance fraud by having
its subjects stage interviews and present misleading facts.61 The
FCC dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the staged
interviews were a matter of “editorial judgment.”62 The D.C. Court
of Appeals disagreed in part, finding that the allegations provided
circumstantial evidence of a staged, or distorted, report. 63 The
court upheld the FCC’s dismissal because it found that the event’s
“basic accuracy” had not been distorted and thus there was no
actionable news distortion.64
In Serafyn v. FCC, the petitioner filed a license renewal
complaint to the FCC, alleging that CBS acted against the public
interest by intentionally distorting a story about Ukraine that
depicted a majority of Ukrainians as anti-Semitic.65 The petitioner
brought the complaint under Section 309(d) of the
Communications Act of 193466 and, after the FCC rejected his
petition, sought review in the D.C. Court of Appeals.67 The court
outlined a two-step analysis that the FCC should apply in these
cases.68 First, the FCC must analyze whether there is a prima facie
case of news distortion.69 Second, the FCC must analyze “both the
60. See Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concluding that
the complainant’s allegations did not rise to the level of an FCC rule violation);
see also Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding that the
FCC arbitrarily and capriciously denied the complainants petition without fully
considering the evidence).
61. See Galloway, 778 F.2d at 18 (stating the petitioner’s claim “that his
name had been forged on the fraudulent bill . . . .”).
62. Id. at 21.
63. See id. (noting that the FCC “is unlikely to find better circumstantial
evidence that an interview is staged”).
64. Id. at 20–21.
65. See Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1213, 1216 (noting that “Serafyn objected that
CBS was not fit to receive a license . . . .”).
66. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (2018) (granting interested persons the right to
petition the FCC to deny a broadcast license application).
67. See Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1213, 1216 (noting the FCC denied the petition
on the ground Serafyn did not allege the matter was intentionally
misrepresented).
68. See id. at 1219 (“[W]e note that the Commission never explained under
which step of the inquiry it resolved this case.”).
69. See id. at 1220 (highlighting the “appropriate questions for the
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substantiality and the materiality of the allegation” to determine
whether the broadcaster can sufficiently serve the public
interest.70 Materiality will only be found where “the licensee itself
is said to have participated in, directed, or at least acquiesced in a
pattern of news distortion.” 71 The court found that the FCC
conflated these two steps when it dismissed the petitioner’s
complaint.72
Both Galloway and Serafyn illustrate the judiciary’s view that
the FCC has been unduly passive when reviewing allegations of
news distortion.73 Moreover, the FCC’s distortion decisions since
these cases indicate that it remains hesitant to find prima facie
evidence of news distortion.74 For example, in a 2013 case, the FCC
declined to further investigate allegations that General
Communications, Inc. (GCI), the corporate owner of multiple
Alaskan broadcast stations, was threatening to distort the news to
serve its business interests.75 The distortion allegations, among a
number of complaints, were brought by nine television licensees,
collectively referred to as the Alaska Broadcasters. 76 The Alaska
Broadcasters alleged that GCI threatened to distort the news in
violation of the public interest when it “explicitly told other
stations and potential employees that it plan[ned] to tailor the
news to be more ‘business-friendly’ [in order to] assure viewpoints
favorable to GCI’s corporate interests.”77 The FCC stated in
response that the allegations, “even if true, would be insufficient
Commission to ask at the threshold stage”).
70. Id. at 1216.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 1220 (“[T]he Commission has misapplied its standard . . . .”).
73. See Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he [FCC’s]
practice in this respect has given its policy against news distortion an extremely
limited scope.”).
74. See Timmer, supra note 35, at 20 (observing that the FCC has reviewed
eight distortion cases since 1999 but concluded in all of them that there was
insufficient evidence of news distortion).
75. See Affiliated Media, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd. 14873, 14881 (2013) (concluding
that the distortion allegations, if true, would only amount to protected editorial
discretion).
76. See id. at 14873 (describing the particular group of complainants as
“licensees of nine television stations in Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, and
Sitka”).
77. Id. at 14881.
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to make out a prima facie showing that grant of the Applications
would be inconsistent with the public interest.”78 The FCC’s
reasoning was that “[t]he First Amendment and section 326 of the
Communications Act bar us from withholding approval of a
transaction based on a change in editorial perspective.”79
The FCC thus implied that agency action here would amount
to censorship, as that is what section 326 expressly prohibits.80
This example illustrates the FCC’s broad interpretation of what
qualifies as editorial discretion, subject only to the requirement
that the licensee operate in good faith.81 Based on this
interpretation, it is hard to see what would cross the line from
editorial discretion to news distortion under the FCC’s current
policy.82 With this interpretation in mind, the FCC’s hesitancy to
enforce the news distortion policy can be properly understood.83
Any licensee action considered to be within the scope of editorial
discretion is awarded full First Amendment protection, which in
turn leaves limited room for the FCC to enforce its current news
distortion policy.84 The Doctrine’s rigidity, combined with the
FCC’s reluctance to investigate cases appearing to be news
distortion on their face, necessitates a new approach to
accomplishing the FCC’s goal of protecting the “public’s ability to
handle its affairs.”85 Part III will highlight news distortion

78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2018) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be understood
or construed to give the [FCC] the power of censorship . . . , and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the [FCC] which shall interfere with
the right of free speech by means of radio communication.”).
81. See Affiliated Media, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd. 14873, 14881 (2013) (ending the
opinion by stating that “[l]icensees are entitled to exercise ‘good faith’ editorial
discretion” without indicating what might violate that standard).
82. See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12 (stating that
broadcasters may not intentionally slant news presentation).
83. See Raphael, supra note 5, at 501 (noting that the FCC only “found
against broadcasters in 10%” of the reported decisions).
84. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998)
(“As a general rule, the nature of editorial discretion counsels against subjecting
broadcasters to claims of viewpoint discrimination.”).
85. See Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20
F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969) (discussing how the rigging of news is the most harmful
act against the public interest).
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examples, in line with the Alaska Broadcasters case, that further
emphasizes the need for a new doctrinal approach.
III. A New Kind of News Distortion: A Focus on Undisclosed
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Media Coverage of
U.S. Military Actions
Corporate media ownership has become increasingly
consolidated over the past several decades.86 From 1983 to 2011,
ninety percent of U.S. media went from being owned by fifty
companies to six.87 This was primarily due to consistent
deregulations from both the FCC and Congress. 88 Analysis of this
deregulation is beyond the scope of this Note but provides
important context for discussing the prevalence of financial
conflicts of interest in corporate media.89
A. The First Case Study: GE, NBC, and the Iraq War
General Electric Company (GE) purchased the National
Broadcasting Company (NBC) in 1985.90 It owned a majority share

86. See Sean M. McGuire, Media Influence and the Modern American
Democracy: Why the First Amendment Compels Regulation of Media Ownership,
4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 689, 703 (2006) (“Perhaps the most dominant
characteristic of the media industry is the tendency toward larger, fewer, and
more centralized ownership groups.”).
87. See Ashley Lutz, These 6 Corporations Control 90% of the Media in
America,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(June
14,
2012,
9:49
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-mediain-america-2012-6 (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (showing an infographic
illustrating “that almost all media comes from the same six sources”)
[perma.cc/EB62-PXQV].
88. See McGuire, supra note 86, at 702 (“Then, in 1996, Congress joined the
deregulation frenzy, passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . [which]
eliminated all caps on national radio station ownership.”).
89. See id. at 704 (noting that “five companies control eighty percent of the
[television] viewing audience”).
90. See David Goldman & Julianne Pepitone, GE, Comcast Announce Joint
NBC
Deal,
CNN
MONEY
(Dec.
3,
2009,
9:57
AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2009/12/03/news/companies/comcast_nbc/index.htm (last
visited Sept 27, 2019) (stating that GE bought NBC “for $6.3 billion to act as a
hedge against its industrial businesses”) [perma.cc/XF39-9GBS].
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in the company until 2009 and a minority share until 2013.91 At
the same time, GE was also a major Defense Department
contractor that manufactured and supplied equipment to the U.S.
military.92 “In 2004, when the Pentagon released its list of top
military contractors for the latest fiscal year, [GE] ranked eighth
with $2.8 billion in contracts.”93 Authors Martin E. Lee and
Norman Solomon defined the financial relationship this way:
“[W]hen correspondents and paid consultants on NBC television
praised the performance of U.S. weapons, they were extolling
equipment made by GE, the corporation that pays their salaries.”94
Leading up to the Iraq war, the national political discussion
was consumed over whether the United States should declare war
upon and invade Iraq, so the national news heavily revolved
around this central issue.95 NBC and its 24/7 cable news channel,
MSNBC, frequently reported on this issue. 96 In 2003—three weeks
before the U.S. military invaded Iraq—MSNBC television host
Phil Donahue had his regularly programmed show cancelled by
network executives.97 Evidence presented in a leaked internal
91. See id. (“Comcast will take a controlling 51% stake in the [NBC] joint
venture, and GE will control 49%.”); see also David Lieberman, Comcast
Completes Acquisition of GE’s 49% Stake in NBCUniversal, DEADLINE (Mar. 19,
2013, 2:15 PM), https://deadline.com/2012/03/comcast-completes-acquisitionnbcuniversal-457181/ (last visited on Sept. 27, 2019) (stating that GE is “out of
the NBCUniversal business”) [perma.cc/CC48-UQTL].
92. See Norman Solomon, The Military-Industrial-Media Complex, FAIRNESS
& ACCURACY IN REPORTING (Aug. 1, 2005), https://fair.org/extra/the-militaryindustrial-media-complex/ (last visited on Sept. 27, 2019) (stating that “NBC’s
owner General Electric designed, manufactured or supplied parts or maintenance
for nearly every major weapon system used by the U.S. during the Gulf War”)
[perma.cc/V942-AP6P].
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343, 349 (2012) (“PBS reported that there were ‘414 Iraq
stories broadcast on NBC, ABC and CBS nightly news, from September 2002 until
February 2003 . . . .’’).
96. See id. at 370 (mentioning that MSNBC hosted a program titled
“Countdown: Iraq with Lester Holt”).
97. See Some Critical Media Voices Face Censorship, FAIRNESS & ACCURACY
IN REPORTING (Apr. 3, 2003), https://fair.org/press-release/some-critical-mediavoices-face-censorship/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (“Starting before the [Iraq] war
began, several national and local media figures have had their work jeopardized,
either explicitly or implicitly because of the critical views they expressed on the
war.”) [perma.cc/2BG5-BRTE].
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NBC memorandum indicated that the show was cancelled due to
Donahue’s tendency to present viewpoints opposing the
government’s official position, meaning viewpoints expressing
opposition to the Iraq war.98 Even before the show’s cancellation,
network executives “imposed a quota system on the Donahue staff
requiring two pro-war guests if [the show] booked one anti-war
advocate.”99 In an interview years later, Donahue contextualized
his firing, stating, “If you’re GE, you certainly don’t want an
anti-war voice on a cable channel that you own . . . . We weren’t
good for business.”100
Around this same time, former pundit and MSNBC producer
Jeff Cohen was removed from MSNBC’s airwaves for reasons he
claims were related to his opposition to military conflict.101 Cohen
claimed that he “argued vigorously against invading Iraq in
debates televised on MSNBC . . . . But as the war neared, [his]
debates were terminated.”102 He described the executives’ editorial
decision-making as follows: “In the land of the First Amendment,
it was [the executives’] choice to shut down debate and
journalism.”103
B. The Second Case Study: The Pentagon Pundit Program

98. See id. (quoting that Donahue’s show presented a “difficult public face
for NBC in a time of war . . . [because he] seems to delight in presenting guests
who are anti-war, anti-Bush and skeptical of the administration’s motives”).
99. Jeff Cohen, Military Propaganda Pushed Me Off TV, HUFFINGTON POST,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/military-propaganda-pushe_b_98925
(last
updated May 25, 2011) (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) [perma.cc/F9NQ-SRMT].
100. Democracy Now!, Phil Donahue on His 2003 Firing From MSNBC, When
Liberal Network Couldn’t Tolerate Antiwar Voices, YOUTUBE (Mar. 21, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ozxzNjRqCiE&t=7s (last visited Feb. 21,
2020) [perma.cc/E2MJ-3V7X].
101. See JEFF COHEN, CABLE NEWS CONFIDENTIAL: MY MISADVENTURES IN
CORPORATE MEDIA 135 (2006) (“There was no room for me after MSNBC launched
Countdown: Iraq—a daily one-hour show that seemed more keen on glamorizing
a potential war than scrutinizing or debating it.”).
102. Jeff Cohen, Military Propaganda Pushed Me Off TV, HUFFINGTON POST
(last updated May 25, 2011) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/militarypropaganda-pushe_b_98925 (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) [perma.cc/2FT3-ZTWS].
103. Id.

248

27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 231 (2020)

NBC is not the only major media corporation with this type of
financial conflict of interest: In 2010, four out of the top ten media
corporations shared board director positions with major Defense
Department contractors.104
The most pervasive type of financial conflict of interest,
however, came from the so-called Pentagon Pundit Program
(Program), in which about seventy-five retired military officers
worked as media analysts as part of a concerted Pentagon effort
“to generate favorable news coverage of the administration’s
wartime performance.”105 These analysts would appear on all of
the national media networks to commentate on U.S. military
policy, and “[m]ost of the analysts ha[d] ties to military contractors
vested in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air.”106
The networks had occasional awareness of these financial
relationships but the viewers were almost never aware.107 This
program generated considerable controversy and led to a U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation to
determine whether the Defense Department had inappropriately
engaged in propaganda activities.108
104. See Peter Phillips & Mickey Huff, Inside the Military Media Industrial
Complex: Impacts on Movements for Peace and Social Justice, PROJECT CENSORED
(May 3, 2010), https://www.projectcensored.org/inside-the-military-mediaindustrial-complex-impacts-on-movements-for-peace/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020)
(listing two board members of Disney, which owns ABC, who are also board
members for Boeing and Halliburton, two major Defense Department contractors)
[perma.cc/AE42-HF24];
see
also
Justin
Schlosberg,
The
Media-Technology-Military Industrial Complex, OPENDEMOCRACY (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/media-technology-military-industrialcomplex/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) (“[L]ess prominent is the interlocking
directorate between media, the state and the defence industry. William Kennard,
for instance, has served on the boards of the New York Times, AT&T and a
number of companies owned by the Carlyle Group, a major US defense
contractor.”) [perma.cc/9MJU-NVQF].
105. David Barstow, Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html
(last visited Sept. 23, 2020) [hereinafter Pentagon’s Hidden Hand] (describing the
Pentagon’s covert, coordinated program of having retired military generals go on
cable networks as analysts and advocate for their pro-war position, often to the
acquiescence of the media outlets) [perma.cc/EM6Y-5AKL].
106. Id.
107. See id. (noting that the “business relationships are hardly ever disclosed
to the viewers, and sometimes not even to the networks themselves.”).
108. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, B-316443, RETIRED MILITARY
OFFICERS AS MEDIA ANALYSTS (2009) (concluding that the financial relationships
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The story of one of these retired military officers, General
Barry R. McCaffrey, helps provide some insight into how this
entanglement of financial interests operates.109 General McCaffrey
was a retired four-star Army general and NBC News military
analyst.110 He had significant governmental influence, “such that
President [George W.] Bush and Congressional leaders from both
parties have invited him for war consultations.”111 In addition, his
“access is such that . . . the Pentagon has arranged numerous trips
to Iraq, Afghanistan and other hotspots solely for his benefit.”112
General McCaffrey simultaneously did business with a number of
companies that had financial relationships with the Defense
Department.113 Then, in his role as an NBC military analyst,
General McCaffrey would advocate for “wartime policies and
spending priorities that are in line with his corporate interests,”
despite the fact that “those interests are not described to NBC’s
viewers.”114 As a military analyst, he is presented “as a
dispassionate expert, not someone who helps companies win
contracts related to the wars he discusses on television.”115 General
McCaffrey’s financial ties were never disclosed on air, but “NBC
executives asserted that the general’s relationships with military
contractors are indirectly disclosed” because his biography is on
NBC’s website, which links to his consulting firm’s website that
provides all the relevant disclosures.116 His website, however,
raised important questions but did not “implicate the prohibition on the use of
appropriations for publicity or propaganda purposes . . .”).
109. See David Barstow, One Man’s Military-Industrial-Media Complex, N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
29,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/washington/30general.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2019) [hereinafter One Man’s Military-Industrial-Media Complex]
(detailing how General McCaffrey used his role as a military analyst to promote
his financial interests with the Defense Department) [perma.cc/QB2J-6W83].
110. See id. (describing General McCaffrey’s influence on network news
programs).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. (noting that “General McCaffrey has immersed himself in
businesses that have grown with the fight against terrorism,” such as Defense
Department contractors Defense Solutions and HNTB Federal Services, as well
as the private equity firm Veritas Capital, which owns equity in contractors).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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listed “his board memberships” but did “not name his clients.” 117
NBC News’ president at the time, Steve Capus, maintained that
“he was unaware of General McCaffrey’s connection” to a Defense
Department contract awarded to Veritas Capital, a private equity
firm that General McCaffrey was working for at the time. 118 “Mr.
Capus declined to comment on whether this information should
have been disclosed.”119
C. Undisclosed Financial Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Media
Continue to Take Place
Similar undisclosed financial conflicts of interest have
continued to this day.120 For example, on January 5, 2020, NBC
had former Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson on its Meet
the Press program to discuss the U.S. military strike that killed
Iranian General Qassem Soleimani.121 NBC failed to disclose,
however, that Johnson, at the time of his appearance, was a board
member of Defense Department contractor Lockheed Martin.122 In
fact, nine other analysts brought on cable news to discuss this
military action were revealed to have undisclosed financial
relationships to the Defense Department. 123
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Robert Parry, Ukraine, through the US Looking Glass, CONSORTIUM
NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://consortiumnews.com/2014/04/16/ukraine-throughthe-us-looking-glass/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (providing instances of the U.S.
media allegedly distorting coverage of the Ukraine-Russia tensions)
[perma.cc/57F3-RAQ8].
121. See Meet the Press – January 5, 2020, NBC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-january-5-2020-n1110181
(last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (providing the full transcript of the day’s Meet the
Press program) [perma.cc/WP9F-3FCX].
122. See Judd Legum (@JuddLegum), TWITTER (Jan. 5, 2020, 2:34 PM),
https://twitter.com/JuddLegum/status/1213906520359997440 (last visited Feb.
21, 2020) (quoting Jeh Johnson’s Meet the Press statements and providing a
screenshot of his Lockheed Martin biography) [perma.cc/2EGU-4DKU].
123. See Judd Legum, 9 Iran Pundits With Undisclosed Ties to the Defense
Industry, POPULAR INFORMATION (Jan. 9, 2020), popular.info/p/9-iran-punditswith-undisclosed-ties (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) (noting that “[v]iewers are not
told of the pundits’ current role in the private sector or their defense industry
ties.”) [perma.cc/XT6J-QFUZ].
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IV. The Case for FCC Regulation of Undisclosed Financial
Conflicts of Interest
In order to get a sense of why undisclosed financial conflicts of
interest in corporate media are aptly defined as news distortion, it
is essential to (1) look to the FCC’s own interpretation of and
intention behind its news distortion policy, and (2) examine the
U.S. Supreme Court’s (Supreme Court) view of the FCC’s
regulatory function.124
A. The Policy Reasons Behind the News Distortion Doctrine
The FCC has been saddled with the arduous task of creating
regulations that serve the “public interest.”125 Two primary
regulatory purposes can be fashioned out of this standard: (1) To
protect the public’s interest in consuming factually based news and
information, and (2) to ensure that the broadcasting framework
furthers citizen self-governance.126 The News Distortion Doctrine
arose out of these purposes, with the FCC stating in 1949, in its
first on-the-record statement addressing news distortion, that
“[t]he basis for any fair consideration of public issues, and
particularly those of a controversial nature, is the presentation of
news and information concerning the basic facts of the controversy
in as complete and impartial a manner as possible.” 127 It went on
to assert that the “licensee would be abusing his position as public
trustee . . . were he to withhold from expression over his facilities
relevant news or facts concerning a controversy or to slant or

124. See Bejesky, supra note 95, at 359–60 (describing how the government’s
official position dominated Iraq war media coverage at the expense of other
sources and viewpoints).
125. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2018).
126. See Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20
F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969) (asserting that “[i]n all cases where way may
appropriately do so, we shall act to protect the public interest in” consuming news
that has not been intentionally distorted); see also Complaint Concerning the CBS
Program “The Selling of the Pentagon,” 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 153 (1971) (“[The FCC
has] allocated so much spectrum space to broadcasting precisely because of the
contribution it can make to an informed public.”).
127. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1254
(1949).
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distort the presentation [of] the news.”128 The FCC asserted that
licensee regulation is appropriate as a means of “ensuring the
conditions for free-wheeling coverage of public affairs and the
contribution
[broadcasting]
could
make
to
citizen
self-governance.”129 It has gone further in recognizing a concern for
the public good, stating that “[r]igging or slanting the news is a
most heinous act against the public interest [and] . . . there is no
act more harmful to the public’s ability to handle its affairs.”130
The FCC has interpreted its distortion policy to apply “to a
wide range of forms of distortion, including staging (or rigging),
slanting, falsification, deception (or misrepresentation) and
suppression.”131 The two most relevant forms for the purposes of
this Note are deception (or misrepresentation) and slanting.132 The
former is concerned with “misleading the public about the source
of information, such as presenting questions and suggestions
written by news staff as if they were posed by viewers.”133 Slanting
is concerned with “the use of deliberate inaccuracy to favor one
viewpoint, or disfavor another, on a matter of public
significance.”134 This can encompass “the systematic promotion or
suppression of stories or viewpoints to serve the licensee’s
ideological views or business interests.” 135 The FCC is “willing to
discipline broadcasters for this type of speech” because it considers
it to be “less worthy of First Amendment protection.”136 It reasons
that since “the danger is manipulation of the news to further the
licensee’s business interests, rather than manipulation of the news
128. Id. at 1254–55.
129. Raphael, supra note 5, at 494.
130. “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d at 151.
131. Raphael, supra note 5, at 496.
132. See id. at 497 (listing the FCC’s various applications of its News
Distortion Doctrine but clarifying that it “has not attempted any comparably clear
definition” of these terms).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 497–98; see also Michael D. Bramble Complaint Against Paul
Bunyan Broad. Co., 58 F.C.C.2d 565, 572 (1976) (“[T]he Commission believes that
the deliberate suppression or attempted suppression of news because of the
licensee’s private interests, personal opinions or prejudices is a form of ‘rigging,’
‘slanting,’ or ‘deliberate distortion’ of the overall news presentation of the
station.”).
136. Raphael, supra note 5, at 529.
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to create a biased or one-sided impression on public issues,” the
FCC “need not be as hesitant in imposing a sanction” because
“there is less potential for [government] censorship.” 137
The undisclosed financial conflicts of interest presented in
Part III effectively misrepresent the information and slant its
presentation in furtherance of financial interests, thus qualifying
as news distortion.138 In both case studies, viewers were not told
throughout its Iraq war coverage of the network’s financial
relationship to the Defense Department, thus having no context to
understand the lens through which the news was being
presented.139 A network’s or analyst’s financial relationship to the
Defense Department is certainly relevant when the discussion is
centered around whether that department should take military
action.140 On-air disclosure of this information would likely provide
the viewers with a better understanding of why the news was
slanted in the way that it was or why Phil Donahue was summarily
fired.141 This Note does not propose a revival of the Fairness
Doctrine, which mandated networks to present both sides of a
news story, but seeks rather to provide viewers with the relevant
information to allow them to decide for themselves whether news
coverage is slanted or not.142

137. Application of WMJX, Inc., 85 F.C.C.2d 251, 266 (1981).
138. See Bejesky, supra note 95, at 353 (observing that “[n]inety-five percent
of citizens were wrong” about whether Iraq had, or was trying to develop, weapons
of mass destruction, “perhaps because they did not possess a satisfactory
understanding to make an objective and informed assessment with the
information they received from the media”).
139. See supra Part III (detailing these conflicts of interest and the networks’
failures to disclose them on-air).
140. See Conflict of Interest, MERRIAM-WEBSTER https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/conflict%20of%20interest (last visited Feb. 21, 2020)
(defining a conflict of interest as “a conflict between the private interests and the
official responsibilities of a person in a position of trust.”) [perma.cc/EBZ86WGB].
141. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing footage of Phil
Donahue contextualizing his firing from MSNBC and describing how his show
was bad for the network’s business).
142. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (describing the
mandates of the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine).
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B. The Supreme Court’s Position on the FCC’s Regulatory Role
The Supreme Court has made it clear that “[i]t is the purpose
of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
government itself or a private licensee.”143 Justice Stephen Breyer
observed that “democratic government presupposes and the First
Amendment seeks to achieve” the facilitation of “public discussion
and informed deliberation.”144
In this spirit, the Court has stated that FCC policy should be
crafted to foster “the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources” because this is “essential to
the welfare of the public.”145 It has afforded the FCC significant
regulatory discretion to promote this public interest standard.146
This regulatory role is considered vital because “freedom of speech
from governmental interference under the First Amendment does
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.” 147
The Supreme Court reiterated its concern for speech
suppression by private interests when it reviewed the
constitutionality of the now-repealed Fairness Doctrine, which
required broadcast stations to discuss public issues and ensure
“that each side of those issues [is] . . . given fair coverage.”148 The
Supreme Court held the doctrine to be constitutional, stating that
“[t]here is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited
private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.” 149 The
143. Id. at 390.
144. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
145. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (quoting
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
146. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (“Our
opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission’s judgment regarding
how the public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial
deference.”).
147. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also Turner
I, 512 U.S. at 657 (“[F]reedom of speech does not disable the government from
taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict . . . the free flow of
information and ideas.”).
148. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969).
149. Id. at 392.
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Supreme Court based its reasoning primarily on the scarcity
rationale, which is the theory that more restrictive regulation is
justified in broadcast media because it is a limited access
platform.150 This rationale is given less weight today due to the
rapid evolution of the internet and alternative media forms, but
the Supreme Court has also used other theories to uphold
broadcast media regulations, such as the pervasive presence
theory.151 This theory proffers that broadcast media is so prevalent
and hard to avoid at times that government regulation will not
offend First Amendment principles the way similar regulation of
print media would.152 The Supreme Court invoked this theory
when it upheld FCC indecency regulations against broadcast
media.153 Indeed, the Supreme Court believes that the FCC “is
entitled to take into account the reality that in a very real sense
listeners and viewers constitute a ‘captive audience.’”154
While these Supreme Court opinions support FCC regulation,
the complexity for the News Distortion Doctrine arises when the
editorial discretion standard is considered.155 The Supreme Court
has stated that “[p]ublic and private broadcasters alike are not
only permitted, but indeed required, to exercise substantial
editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of their
programming.”156 Broadcasters are afforded “the widest possible
journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations,” and the
FCC may only regulate them under the authority of the
150. See id. at 390 (“Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose
views should be expressed on this unique medium.”).
151. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“[T]he broadcast
media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans.”).
152. See id. (noting that the “broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and
out” which makes it hard to protect the “viewer from unexpected program
content”).
153. See id. (reasoning that “offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of the
home . . .”).
154. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973).
155. See Affiliated Media, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd 14873, 14881 (2013) (declining to
take action against a license assignment applicant because, even if the distortion
allegations were found to be true, the actions were considered to be within the
applicant’s editorial discretion).
156. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
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Communications Act of 1934 “when the interests of the public are
found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the
broadcasters.”157 Under this framework, the government’s
regulatory role is to ensure that editorial discretion remains in
furtherance of the public interest, not in conflict with it.158
C. Regulation in this Area Furthers FCC Objectives and First
Amendment Principles
FCC regulation of corporate media’s financial conflicts of
interest would further the FCC’s dual purpose of ensuring that
broadcasters (1) present factually based news and (2) promote an
informed citizenry.159 The undisclosed conflicts undermine this
dual purpose and are inconsistent with the First Amendment’s
ideals.160
The FCC is most comfortable regulating a broadcaster when
that broadcaster has slanted or misrepresented the news in order
“to further the [broadcaster’s] business interests.”161 The examples
provided in Part III fit comfortably within this description.162
Consider the GE/NBC example discussed above.163 The leaked
internal NBC memorandum highlighted a direct link between
NBC’s actions related to Phil Donahue’s show and GE’s business
interests with the U.S. Defense Department.164 Next, consider the
Pentagon Pundit Program example.165 The military analysts’
financial relationships to the Defense Department presented
157. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973).
158. See id. at 111 (discussing the FCC’s now-repealed Fairness Doctrine and
noting that the broadcaster’s “discretion is bounded by rules designed to assure
that the public interest in fairness is furthered”).
159. See cases cited supra note 127 and accompanying text.
160. See discussion supra Part III (presenting numerous examples of
undisclosed conflicts on television networks).
161. See case cited supra note 137 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Part III (providing examples of news distortion and financial
conflicts of interest on television networks).
163. See supra Section III.A (describing NBC’s financial ties to the Defense
Department and its cancellation of Phil Donahue’s show).
164. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Section III.B (detailing the coordinated Defense Department
efforts to have media analysts advocate for the Iraq war).
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financial conflict of interests that, while not directly sourced to the
networks, raise the same misrepresentation problem.166 The media
has an immensely powerful role in shaping public opinion, and
thus the viewing public’s ability to develop informed opinions is
harmed when crucial information is omitted.167
Moreover, these undisclosed financial conflicts of interest are
inconsistent with the First Amendment’s purpose of “preserv[ing]
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”168 This is evidenced by the
disproportionate amount of time media networks have spent
presenting the government’s official position at the expense of
other viewpoints, specifically in times of war.169 This reality
compromises the “dominant paradigm” of the marketplace of ideas
and necessitates fresh thinking on how that marketplace can
actually be achieved.170
Although it appears counterintuitive, compelling arguments
have been made that government regulation is sometimes
necessary to further democratic values of free speech. 171 All
government action relating to speech is understandably suspect
166. See id. (describing the Pentagon Pundit Program and the multitude of
incidents in which broadcast networks hosted military analysts without
disclosing their financial conflicts of interest).
167. See ROBERT ENTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF POWER: FRAMING NEWS, PUBLIC
OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 6 (2004) (describing the phenomenon of
“substantive framing” in mass media and the impact that it has on public
opinion); see also EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING
CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 2 (2d ed. 2002) (analyzing
mass media’s corporate structures and the outsized role they play in influencing
public opinion).
168. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
169. See Bejesky, supra note 124, at 361–62 (noting study findings conducted
over a one-week period that “of the 267 on-camera sources, [75%] were current or
former government officials, just [6%] were skeptics about the need for war, and
less than [1%] were identified with anti-war activism”); see also id. at 359 (citing
a University of Maryland study that found a “symbiotic relationship between
policymakers and the press” during coverage of the Iraq war); Hannibal Travis,
Media Self-Censorship: Postmodern Censorship of Pacifist Content on Television
and the Internet, 25 N.D. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 47, 62 (noting that, during the
Gulf War of 1991, “[n]ational anti-war leaders appeared on television about [99%]
less often than national leaders in support of the war.”).
170. Bejesky, supra note 124, at 357.
171. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH xix
(1st ed. 1993) (devoting “particular attention to the possibility that government
controls on the broadcast media, designed to ensure diversity of view and
attention to public affairs, would help the system of free expression”).
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and “thought to compromise First Amendment principles,” but
these particular financial conflicts of interest present a unique case
where government action has the ability to “actually promote those
very principles.”172 According to legal theorist Thomas I. Emerson,
there are four primary functions of democratic freedom of
expression, two of which are to “advance knowledge and discover[]
truth,” and “to provide for participation in decision making by all
members of society.”173 These functions echo both the FCC’s and
Supreme Court’s statements on free expression.174 The conflicts of
interest presented in Part III are incompatible with these
fundamental principles.175 Such vital First Amendment issues
command their own discussion and will be explored at length in
Part VI.176
D. The News Distortion Doctrine Cannot Address These Issues,
but the Principles Behind It Can
The New Distortion Doctrine is unable to address the
distortion issues presented in Part III.177 First, it only applies to
licensed broadcast stations.178 It thus does not reach any
undisclosed financial conflicts of interest on cable networks such
as MSNBC, CNN, and Fox News. Second, the FCC’s inability to
independently enforce the Doctrine renders it largely “symbolic” as
“suggested by the paucity of distortion decisions against
broadcasters, and of significant penalties assessed.” 179 This
presumably does little to discourage broadcasters from engaging in
this type of behavior.180 Third, the distortion issues identified in

172. Id.
173. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–9 (1970).
174. See discussion supra Section IV (outlining both the Supreme Court’s and
FCC’s views on freedom of expression).
175. See supra Part III (providing examples of news distortion and financial
conflicts of interest on television networks).
176. See infra Part IV.
177. See supra Part III.
178. See case cited supra note 18 and accompanying text.
179. Raphael, supra note 5, at 510.
180. See Timmer supra note 35, at 22 (providing examples of news distortion
allegations from as recently as 2016).
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Part III would not fall under the current Doctrine.181 While the
fourth element (implication of a significant news event) of the
FCC’s policy will presumably be met, the first three impose higher
burdens of proof that are rarely met, as evidenced by the FCC’s
inability to reach a finding of news distortion on the overwhelming
majority of occasions.182 Fourth, the FCC’s caselaw indicates that
it seems unsure of what is and is not actionable news distortion
under its own policy.183 For example, the FCC has stated that
broadcaster news manipulations that are intended to serve their
business interests are more worthy of FCC intervention than other
types of distortion.184 However, the FCC contradicted this
assertion in the previously discussed Affiliated Media, Inc. case, in
which it said that evidence of news manipulation intended to serve
the broadcaster’s business interests would not rise to the level of
distortion.185 This inconsistency can be attributed to the
amorphous construction of the policy which enables the FCC’s
interpretation to vary from case to case.186 This can make it hard
for the broadcasters to determine whether they will face FCC
scrutiny the next time they have to apply for a license renewal.187

181. See supra Section II.A (deducing the four elements of news distortion
under current policy as (1) intent to slant or mislead, (2) extrinsic evidence to
support the allegation, (3) knowledge from management or upper-level personnel,
and (4) implication of a significant news event).
182. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Section II.B (analyzing the FCC’s distortion cases over the last
several decades).
184. See supra notes 126–129 and accompanying text.
185. See Affiliated Media, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd. 14873, 14881 (2013) (stating that
allegations of a corporate owner of multiple Alaskan broadcast stations
“tailor[ing] the news” in order to be more “favorable to [its] corporate
interests . . . even if true, would be insufficient to make out a prima facie showing”
of news distortion).
186. See supra Section II.B (analyzing the FCC’s distortion cases over the last
several decades).
187. See Michael D. Bramble Complaint Against Paul Bunyan Broad. Co., 58
F.C.C.2d 565, 572 (1976) (asserting that “that the deliberate suppression or
attempted suppression of news because of the licensee’s private interests”
constitutes “a form of ‘rigging,’ ‘slanting,’ or ‘deliberate distortion’ of the overall
news presentation of the station.”). But see Affiliated Media, 28 FCC Rcd. at 14881
(stating that allegations of distortion expressly motivated by business interests
“would be insufficient” to constitute news distortion).
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V. Authorizing and Proposing a Financial Conflict of Interest
Disclosure Rule
A. The Proposed Disclosure Rule Should Apply to Networks
Hosted on Cable and Satellite
The FCC’s rationale behind its news distortion policy is
straightforward: It considers news distortion to be a “heinous act
against the public interest” that harms “the public’s ability to
handle its affairs.”188 The policy’s purpose of reducing news
distortion will be furthered by its application to cable networks,
due to their “outsized” impact on public perception.189 While cable
news garners the least number of viewers among the three primary
television news mediums (local television news, national networks
such as CBS and NBC, and cable networks), its viewership group
spends significantly more time watching than the other two
viewership groups.190 Even heavy viewers of local television news
and network news have been found to spend more time watching
cable news than these other news mediums. 191 This “deeper level
of viewer engagement” helps explain why cable news is perceived
as having “an outsized ability to influence the national debate and
news agenda.”192 The reality of this influence heightens the
importance of applying the news distortion policy to cable.193
188. Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d
143, 151 (1969).
189. See Nareissa L. Smith, Consumer Protection in the Marketplace of Ideas:
A Proposal to Extend the News Distortion Doctrine to Cable Television News
Programs, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 223, 235–37 (2015) (examining studies on cable
news and noting that these outlets have a significant, and at times “outsized,”
ability to influence the public).
190. See Mark Jurkowitz & Amy Mitchell, How Americans Get TV News at
Home, PEW RESEARCH CENTER:
JOURNALISM & MEDIA (Oct. 11, 2013),
https://www.journalism.org/2013/10/11/how-americans-get-tv-news-at-home/
(last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (“On average, the cable news audience devotes twice
as much time to that news source as local and network viewers spend on those
platforms.”) [perma.cc/TS5Q-46KN].
191. See id. (“The heaviest local news viewers spend, on average, 11 more
minutes watching cable news than local news. The heaviest network news
viewers spend about one more minute watching cable news than they do network
news.”).
192. Id.
193. See Smith, supra note 188, at 237 (“In sum, cable news is more popular
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B. The FCC Has Authority to Regulate Cable and Satellite, but It
Is Limited
In this administrative area, the courts have given Congress
and the FCC significant latitude to determine the extent of the
FCC’s jurisdiction.194 With regard to cable networks in particular,
the Supreme Court held in United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co.195 that the FCC’s jurisdiction extends to cable.196 In that case,
the FCC issued rules limiting the extent to which cable television
operators could expand their service, and the issue was whether
the FCC had the authority to make this rule and issue a
prohibitory order to enforce it.197 Holding in favor of the FCC, the
Supreme Court determined that the FCC had “reasonably
concluded that regulatory authority over [cable television] is
imperative if it is to perform with appropriate effectiveness certain
of its other responsibilities.”198 The Court concluded that the FCC’s
authority to regulate cable extended only to actions considered to
be “reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the [FCC’s]
various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting.”199 In light of this decision, the FCC proceeded to
promulgate rules governing cable television in 1972.200 This
included rules such as “equal time, sponsorship identification and
other provisions similar to [those] applicable to broadcasters.”201
than its counterparts, its viewers are more engaged, and cable news is the most
accepted source of news for politics, business, and social issues.”).
194. See Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[W]ithin the
constraints of the Constitution, Congress and the [FCC] may set the scope of
broadcast regulation . . . .”).
195. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)
(holding that the FCC’s jurisdiction extends to cable).
196. See id. (“[W]e therefore hold that the [FCC’s] authority over ‘all
interstate . . . communication by wire or radio’ permits the regulation of CATV [or
cable] systems.”).
197. See id. at 166–67 (describing the factual history behind the FCC’s rule
proposals and the subsequent legal issues that arose from those actions).
198. See id. at 173.
199. Id. at 178.
200. See Cable Television, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (last
updated Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/media/engineering/cable-television
(last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (describing the extensive history of the FCC’s cable
television regulation) [perma.cc/9Q3K-W6AV].
201. Id.
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Congress later passed the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, which affirmatively established the FCC’s authority to
regulate cable television.202 The FCC’s regulatory authority over
satellite is similar to that of cable.203
Legal scholars have proposed to extend the News Distortion
Doctrine to cable television, and that proposal is adopted here for
the disclosure rule.204 The scope of this regulatory authority,
however, is limited.205 Therefore, this Note proposes that Congress
amend the Communications Act of 1934 to give the FCC explicit
statutory authorization to promulgate disclosure requirements
applicable to cable and satellite providers, in addition to licensed
broadcasters.
C. Applying the Disclosure Rule to Cable and Satellite: Proposing
a Statutory Amendment to the Communications Act of 1934
Section 612 of the Communications Act of 1934, which is
codified as 47 U.S.C. § 532 and governs the use of “cable channels
for commercial use,” should be amended to expressly authorize and
direct the FCC to promulgate disclosure requirements for video
programming provided through multichannel video programming
distributors.206 The term “multichannel video programming
distributors” is proposed in order to encompass both cable and
satellite providers, which host the network channels.207 The model
statutory amendment will read as follows:
202. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98
Stat. 2779 (“To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to provide a national
policy regarding cable television.”).
203. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(upholding § 25 of the 1992 Cable Act which required direct broadcast satellite
(DBS) providers to allocate channels for noncommercial and educational
programming).
204. See Smith, supra note 188, at 263–64 (proposing to extend the News
Distortion Doctrine’s application to cable news).
205. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 223–25 (1997)
(upholding the FCC’s content-neutral must-carry rules but declining to address
the scope of the decision’s applicability to content-based regulations).
206. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (2018).
207. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘multichannel video
programming distributor’ means a person such as, but not limited to, a cable
operator, . . . a direct broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only
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Synopsis. “An Act to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to
provide increased transparency for viewers and to promote the
public’s interest in enhanced public discussion and an informed
citizenry.”
Section 1. Financial
Requirement.

Conflict

of

Interest

Disclosure

(a) Authority to Enforce. Section 612 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 532) is amended in the following
ways:
(1)
subsection (c)(2) is amended by adding the
following clause at the end of its paragraph: “and may
require disclosure regulations pursuant only to the
requirements of subsection (k)”;
(2)
subsection (h) is amended by adding the
following sentence at the end: “This subsection shall
also permit a multichannel video programming
distributor, as defined under 47 U.S.C. § 522, to enforce
a written and published financial disclosure policy in
accordance with subsection (k).”
(b) Commission Regulations. Subsection 612 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 532) is amended by
inserting after subsection (j) the following new subsection:
“(k) Within 120 days following the date of the enactment of this
subsection, the Commission shall initiate a rulemaking
proceeding to prescribe regulations requiring on-air financial
disclosures of an on-air person’s or entity’s financial conflict(s)
of interest, during any discussion of U.S. military action or
proposed U.S. military action. The regulations shall define
financial conflicts of interest for the purposes of this subsection
and provide clear disclosure guidelines with which
multichannel video programming distributors must comply.” 208

The statutory language is modeled after amendments that
were made to this same section as part of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act of
1992).209 The framework authorizes cable and satellite providers to
satellite program distributor, who makes available for purchase, by subscribers
or customers, multiple channels of video programming[.]”).
208. See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (2018); see generally Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 10, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460
(providing the textual template for the statutory amendment proposal).
209. See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (2018) (authorizing both cable operators and the FCC
to regulate indecent programming).

264

27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 231 (2020)

publish and enforce the disclosure rules themselves, in the same
way that the Cable Act of 1992 authorized cable operators to
publish and enforce indecency regulations.210 This amendment will
provide the express congressional authority necessary for the FCC
to promulgate the financial conflicts of interest disclosure
requirement presented in the following subsection.
D. Proposing a Financial Conflicts of Interest Disclosure
Requirement
To address the news distortion issues presented in Part III,
the following model regulation is proposed to be promulgated by
the FCC:
Financial Conflicts of Interest Disclosure Requirement.
(a) A financial conflict of interest, for the purpose of this rule, is
defined as a financial relationship in which a person or entity
who will appear on-air to discuss an ongoing, proposed, or
potential U.S. military action, has, either directly or through a
third party, a personal financial interest in the affairs of the
U.S. Defense Department.
(b) On-air disclosure of a financial conflict of interest is required
if the following two elements are met: (1) An ongoing, proposed,
or potential U.S. military action is being discussed on-air, and
(2) a person on-air to discuss the action, or the multichannel
video programming distributor or television network, has a
financial conflict of interest as defined by subsection (a).
(c) The disclosure required by subsection (b) shall be provided
for the entirety of the on-air discussion and shall fully disclose
the identity of the third party, if such third party exists, that is
the source of the financial conflict of interest.

The rule must be promulgated in accordance with the
requirements set forth by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).211 It will apply to all network channels hosted by cable and
satellite providers, as authorized by the proposed statutory
authorization. The disclosure rule should also be applied to
210. See id. (authorizing cable operators to enforce “a written and published
policy” regulating indecent programming).
211. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (prescribing the rule making procedures for
agency action).
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licensed broadcasters in addition to, not in place of, the current
News Distortion Doctrine.212 This ensures the rule’s applicability
to all networks addressed in Part III. 213 The FCC shall have the
authority to enforce fines for the violations of the rule, as it does
for other promulgated regulations.214
The proposed rule follows the principle of current FCC rules
requiring on-air disclosure of any programming that the station
has been paid to air.215 In addition, the proposal is in effect a
codification of transparency principles that exist in ethical codes
for both journalism and television news. 216 For example, the Public
Broadcasting Service, in its Editorial Standards and Practices,
states that “transparency requires that producers disclose to the
audience all sources of funding for the production and distribution
of content.”217
This rule imposes an affirmative duty on broadcasters and
television networks to be aware of any existing financial conflicts
of interest before they air programming related to U.S. military
action. This duty will ensure that the viewing public is provided

212. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. (discussing the News Distortion
Doctrine).
213. See supra Part III (providing detailed examples of undisclosed financial
conflicts of interest in both broadcast and cable media).
214. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 258 (2012)
(striking down fines, levied against Fox and ABC for violations of the FCC’s
indecency rules, on “fair notice grounds,” not on the FCC’s authority to impose
the fines).
215. See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2018) (“All matter broadcast by any radio station for
which any money . . . is directly or indirectly paid [to] . . . the station so
broadcasting, from any person, shall . . . be announced as paid or furnished, as
the case may be, by such person . . . .”).
216. See Code of Ethics, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N (June 11,
2015), https://www.rtdna.org/content/rtdna_code_of_ethics (last visited Feb. 21,
2020) (“[I]ndependence from influences that conflict with [the] public interest
remains an essential ideal of journalism. Transparency provides the public with
the means to assess credibility and to determine who deserves trust.”)
[perma.cc/7QAV-2RPB]; see also SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PRO. JOURNALISTS
(Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2020)
(stating that journalists should “[d]isclose unavoidable conflicts” and “[i]dentify
content provided by outside sources, whether paid or not.”) [perma.cc/EL48R3BF].
217. PBS Editorial Standards and Practices, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE
(last updated Aug. 2018), https://www.pbs.org/about/producing-pbs/editorialstandards/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) [perma.cc/8ZS3-4YT6].
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with vital context when receiving information on an incredibly
sensitive news topic.218
VI. First Amendment Constitutional Analysis
There are, of course, serious First Amendment concerns raised
by any proposal to the government to regulate the media. 219 This
Part addresses those concerns and argues that the rule does not
chill, suppress, or compel speech, but rather promotes speech in
the spirit of the First Amendment.
It is worth noting at the outset that the statutory amendment
proposal raises the preliminary constitutional issue of Congress’
authority to pass the law and delegate responsibilities to the
FCC.220 The Communications Act of 1934 was passed under the
constitutional authority of the Commerce Clause, and Congress
has long had the authority to delegate certain powers to
government agencies, so these issues will not be addressed here.221
In the FCC regulatory context, there are two separate groups
with competing First Amendment interests that must be balanced:
The viewing public on one hand and networks, cable operators,
broadcasters, and other media entities on the other.222 The
Supreme Court has stated that it “is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount.”223
The forthcoming constitutional analysis necessarily focuses on the
interests of the latter groups, considering that they bear the
218. See Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1254 (1949) (emphasizing the importance of presenting news and information “in
as complete and impartial a manner as possible”).
219. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of . . . the press . . . .”).
220. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
(requiring Congress to articulate an “intelligible principle” before it delegates
authority to a government agency).
221. See id. (holding that Congress may delegate its authority subject to
certain limitations); see also 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (creating the FCC for “the
purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication”).
222. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102–03, 110 (1973)
(discussing the need to weigh the “interests of the public” with the “private
journalistic interests of the broadcasters” to determine when regulatory action is
appropriate).
223. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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burden of compliance with the proposed regulation.224 The viewing
public’s First Amendment interests, however, are the motivating
factor behind this rule proposal, and the objective here is to
demonstrate that the furtherance of one does not require the
constraint of the other.225
A. The Standard of Review for Media Regulations
Although broadcast media regulations receive less
constitutional scrutiny than print media regulations, cable media
is subject to more demanding scrutiny than broadcast.226 These
legal distinctions have become increasingly questioned in recent
years by Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars alike.227 This
debate is beyond the scope of this Note and is ultimately
immaterial, because the standard of review analysis here will rest
solely on whether the challenged regulations are content-based or
content-neutral.228
In Turner I, the Supreme Court held that when reviewing the
constitutionality of government regulations imposed on cable,
intermediate scrutiny will be applied to content-neutral
regulations while strict scrutiny will be applied to content-based
regulations.229 The Court’s reason for the distinction was
straightforward and has been a settled First Amendment principle
224. See supra Section V.D. Proposing a Financial Conflicts of Interest Disclosure
Requirement(applying the proposed rule to broadcasters, cable operators, and
satellite providers).
225. See supra Section IV.C (arguing that FCC regulation would promote
First Amendment principles).
226. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 748 (highlighting broadcast’s more “limited
First Amendment protection” compared to print); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v.
F.C.C. (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (“[T]he rationale for applying a less
rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation . . . does
not apply in the context of cable regulation.”).
227. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 532–33 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The justifications relied on by the Court in Red Lion
and Pacifica . . . neither distinguish broadcast from cable, nor explain the relaxed
application of the principles of the First Amendment to broadcast.”).
228. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662 (concluding that intermediate scrutiny, as
opposed to strict scrutiny, will apply to content-neutral cable regulations).
229. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997)
(“Content-neutral regulations do not pose the same ‘inherent dangers to free
expression’ . . . that content-based regulations do . . . .”).
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for some time:
Content-based speech regulations are
constitutionally suspect because they are more likely to have the
effect of unconstitutionally suppressing speech, while
content-neutral rules that only regulate the time, place, or manner
of speech do not carry that same risk.230
The Supreme Court in Turner I reviewed the constitutionality
of the FCC’s “so-called must-carry” rules, “which require cable
operators to carry the signals of a specified number of local
broadcast television stations.”231 The Court found these rules to be
content-neutral, reasoning that they did not “impose[] a
restriction, penalty, or burden by reason of the views, programs, or
stations the cable operator has selected or will select.”232 In its
second hearing of the case, the Court ultimately held these rules
to be constitutional under the intermediate scrutiny standard of
review.233
B. Constitutional Analysis of Financial Conflicts of Interest Rule
Proposal
There may be a strained argument that the proposed
disclosure rule is content-neutral but, based on the Supreme
Court’s Turner I precedent, a court will likely find it to be
content-based.234 The rule expressly applies to discussions of “U.S.
military actions” so its application is contingent on the content of
the speech.235 Thus, a court would apply strict scrutiny when
reviewing a constitutional challenge to this rule.236
230. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 676 (“The government does have the power to
impose content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions . . . .”).
231. Id. at 630.
232. Id. at 644.
233. See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224 (concluding that it will not “displace
Congress’ judgment respecting content-neutral regulations with our own.”).
234. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C. (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 644 (1994)
(finding the must-carry rules to be content-neutral because they do not impose “a
restriction, penalty, or burden by reason of the views, programs, or stations the
cable operator has selected or will select.”).
235. See supra Section V.D (proposing financial disclosure rule).
236. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 643 (stating that “laws that by their terms
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views expressed are content-based . . .”).
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It does not follow, however, that any content-based law will
fail, as content-based laws have passed strict scrutiny before.237 In
fact, the FCC has a number of content-based regulations applicable
to licensed broadcasters, such as access requirements for political
candidates, station identification requirements, and restrictions
on obscene and indecent programming.238 The indecency
restrictions currently apply to cable but, regardless, the proposed
statutory amendment unambiguously extends content-based
regulatory authority to cable and satellite providers.239
A content-based law is constitutional if the government can
prove to the court that it has a compelling interest, or purpose, for
regulating the content and that the means chosen were narrowly
tailored to achieve that purpose.240
First, the government has a compelling interest in promoting
an informed citizenry able “to handle its affairs,” especially when
it comes to an issue as consequential as military action.241 The
purpose thus promotes the public’s First Amendment “right to
form and hold beliefs” in furtherance of “a system of freedom of
expression.”242 The Supreme Court has recognized the importance
of this interest, stating that the “First Amendment’s command that
government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the
government from taking steps to ensure that private interests [do]
not restrict . . . the free flow of information and ideas.”243
Second, the disclosure requirement is narrowly tailored to
serve the public’s First Amendment interests. It applies only to
237. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a state
law, which prohibits vote solicitation at polling places on election days, survives
strict scrutiny); see also Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–29
(2010) (upholding a law under a strict scrutiny analysis which prohibited the
provision of support to designated foreign terrorist organizations).
238. See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12–19 (listing the
regulations applicable to all broadcasters).
239. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
§ 10, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (authorizing both cable operators and
the FCC to regulate indecent programming).
240. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 199 (stating that the government “must
demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest”).
241. Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d
143, 151 (1969).
242. EMERSON, supra note 173, at 21–22.
243. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994).
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discussions about U.S. military action, preventing potential
overreach into unintended areas and ensuring that networks are
able to clearly comply with its requirements.244 In addition, the
rule does not suppress or censor speech but only requires public
disclosure.245 Challengers to this rule would argue that this is not
a mild disclosure requirement but a form of compelled speech. 246
The Supreme Court disagrees, however, as it addressed this issue
in Citizens United v. FEC247 and held that a disclosure requirement
for political campaign advertisements was constitutional.248 The
Court reasoned that the requirement did not violate the First
Amendment because it “insure[s] that the voters are fully informed
about who is speaking” and is “the less restrictive alternative to
more comprehensive speech regulations.”249
Here, the FCC could seek to prohibit or limit on-air discussions
where financial conflicts of interest exist, which would quite
clearly be speech suppression. 250 A second alternative is to do
nothing and leave the issue unaddressed, in which case the public’s
First Amendment interest in a fully informed citizenry would be
undermined.251
For these reasons, the proposed financial conflicts of interest
disclosure rule should be upheld as constitutional under a strict
scrutiny standard of review.

244. See supra Section V.D (proposing financial disclosure rule).
245. See supra Section V.D (proposing financial disclosure rule).
246. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (noting that the First
Amendment protects both “compelled speech and compelled silence”).
247. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (holding that the
disclaimer and disclosure requirements are constitutional because they do not
“prevent anyone from speaking . . .”).
248. See id. at 16 (stating that the advertisements in question “avoid
confusion by making clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or political
party”).
249. Id. at 315–16.
250. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960) (Black, J.
concurring) (emphasizing that “First Amendment rights are beyond abridgment”
whether it is through direct restraint or suppression).
251. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC’s
statement against news distortion).
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VII. Conclusion
The FCC created the News Distortion Doctrine in response to
a recognition that news can be manipulated by broadcasters in a
way that misleads the public and undermines its ability to “handle
its affairs.”252 The policy reasons behind the Doctrine are
compelling and seek to further the First Amendment’s ideals, but
the Doctrine itself has failed to do so. 253 The Doctrine is unduly
hard to satisfy, the FCC has rarely enforced it when it appears it
has been satisfied, and it only applies to a subset of mass media.254
This Note has proposed a novel way of thinking about news
distortion in order to advance the objectives behind the Doctrine.255
As shown in Part III, serious distortion issues persist throughout
televised media, in which central information on vital public
matters are not disclosed to the public.256 The FCC should
promulgate disclosure rules applicable to media networks in
broadcast, cable, and satellite in order to address these issues, and
Congress should pass a statutory amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934 to authorize this regulation.257 This
issue presents the rare situation where government regulation will
further the First Amendment’s ideals to the public’s benefit.258

252. Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C. 2d
143, 151 (1969).
253. See supra Section IV.D (proposing financial disclosure rule).
254. See id. (proposing financial disclosure rule).
255. See supra Part IV (explaining why undisclosed financial conflicts of
interest should be thought of as news distortion).
256. See supra Part III (providing examples of how undisclosed financial
conflicts of interest misled the public).
257. See supra Section V.C (applying the disclosure rule to cable and satellite:
proposing a statutory amendment to the communications act of 1934).
258. See cases cited supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing news
distortion).

